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NO. 18 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
Towards Jewish-Arab Normalization 
in Israel 
Israeli Arabs Want a More Pragmatic Politics while Jewish Parties Court the Arab Vote 
Lidia Averbukh 
In the run-up to the 2021 elections to the Knesset, Jewish parties are actively courting 
the votes of Israeli Arabs, who constitute 17 per cent of all Israelis eligible to vote. At the 
same time, Israeli Arabs are increasingly emphasizing the need for a politics that will 
help improve their living circumstances and allow them greater political participation. 
While the Joint List alliance of Arab parties continues to follow its traditional opposi-
tionist course and has come to terms with the decision of one of its members, the Islamic 
Movement (Ra’am), to split away, the election campaign has seen the emergence of new 
Arab politics, whose actors advocate a more pragmatic approach and are looking to 
cooperate with Jewish parties. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the identity of the 
Jewish state of Israel are playing a secondary role. The situation is similar in Israeli local 
politics, where Jews and Arabs are already engaged in interest-based cooperation. 
 
“For many, many years, the Arab public 
was outside the mainstream of leadership,” 
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said 
during the 2021 election campaign. But 
there was no reason for this, he commented, 
adding that the elections should demon-
strate that the Arabs are part of Israel’s suc-
cess story. With these words, he signalled 
a remarkable turnaround, since a coalition 
with Arab parties had been taboo in the 
election campaigns of recent years. Right-
wing Jewish parties regarded their Arab 
counterparts as the “fifth column”, as sub-
versive actors with whom cooperation 
would pose an existential threat to the 
state. In order to keep down the number 
of Israeli Arabs turning out to vote, Likud 
sought to intimidate them. For example, 
it arranged for cameras to be installed at 
the polling stations in Arab districts because 
of what it alleged was fraudulent voting. 
In 2015 Netanyahu warned about “Arabs 
going in droves to the polling stations”. Nor 
were the parties from the Left or the Centre 
able to duck the impact of the anti-Arab 
slogans. They distanced themselves from 
Arab voters and parties for fear of being 
discredited as anti-Zionist. Both camps – 
the Right and the Centre-Left – adopted 
strategies that counted mainly on the 
Jewish vote. The bulk of the Arab voter 
was left, virtually uncontested, to the Arab 
Hadash, Balad, Ta’al and Ra’am parties. 
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The Rise and Fall of the Joint List 
In 2015 four Arab parties merged to form 
the Joint List in order to circumvent the 
3.25 per cent barrier, which, introduced 
the previous year, was targeted, above all, 
against them. After having dissolved itself 
temporarily for tactical reasons, the alliance 
re-emerged for the election to the 22nd 
Knesset in September 2019 so that its com-
bined strength could be used to exercise 
more influence over Arab issues. It re-
mained intact for the election to the 23rd 
Knesset in 2020. 
The Arab parties’ harsh rejection by 
the Jewish parties and their concentrated 
presence in the Joint List had the effect of 
gradually mobilizing the Arab Israelis, who 
traditionally have remained aloof from 
national elections. Turnout among this seg-
ment of the population stood at 63.4 per 
cent in 2015 (20th Knesset) and 59.2 per 
cent in 2019 (22th Knesset), which gave the 
alliance 13 mandates on each occasion. In 
2020 (23rd Knesset), it peaked at 64.8 per 
cent, whereby the Arab List became the 
largest opposition party in the parliament 
with 15 mandates. This new-found strength 
meant that Arab parties – and thus Arab 
votes – were increasingly perceived as 
having political relevance. For its part, the 
Arab List hoped that one day it would be 
able to cast off the role of outsider. 
After the last election, in 2020, the Arab 
parliamentary deputies used their new situa-
tion to publicly throw their unanimous 
support behind a Jewish candidate – the 
first time they had done so since 1992 when 
Yitzhak Rabin won the elections. The Arab 
parties backed Benny Gantz so that he would 
be the first to conduct coalition talks. Their 
hope was that Netanyahu would be replaced 
as prime minister. 
However, although Gantz was able to 
strengthen his negotiating position with 
the help of Arab votes, he distanced himself 
from the Joint List and broke his promise 
not to join a coalition government led by 
Netanyahu. The so-called national unity 
government formed by Zionist parties from 
the Right to the Centre-Left was aimed at 
finally delivering political stability and 
excluded not only Arab deputies but also 
extreme right-wing Jewish parties. There-
after, the Centre-Left camp, which had 
campaigned as the “anti-Bibi camp”, dis-
integrated; only some of its deputies had 
wanted to belong to a coalition under 
Netanyahu. As a result, the new govern-
ment remained unstable. 
For his part, the head of the Joint List, 
Ayman Odeh of the Hadash party, lost 
credibility, having failed with his strategy 
of putting the entire political weight of the 
Arab parties at the disposal of the “anti-Bibi 
camp” in the hope of achieving political 
concessions in the future. It is true that the 
strong performance of the Arab List was 
one of the reasons why, in the last three 
elections (in 2019 and 2020), Netanyahu did 
not obtain a majority for a purely right-
wing government; but, other than this, the 
List was unable to reap any benefits from 
its record number of seats. 
Competing for Arab Votes 
Because the Joint List remained excluded 
from any decision-making processes and 
had no possibility to exercise any influence, 
there was growing discontent over the 
course being pursued by Odeh. For its part, 
the Islamic Movement (Ra’am) began to 
split away from the alliance – a develop-
ment that was expedited by Netanyahu’s 
sudden change of course. Faced with a col-
lapsing government coalition, the prime 
minister found himself looking for new 
allies. On several occasions, he was able to 
reach agreement on tacit cooperation with 
Mansour Abbas, the head of the Islamic 
Movement. For example, in early December 
2020 parliamentary deputies from this party 
absented themselves during voting on the 
dissolution of the Knesset in order not to 
have to vote with other deputies from the 
Joint List for the resignation of the Netan-
yahu government. Moreover, Abbas pre-
vented the role played by the prime minis-
ter in the submarine corruption affair from 
being investigated. 
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After the Knesset had been dissolved in 
December 2020 and new elections sched-
uled for March 2021, Netanyahu launched 
his election campaign by visiting several 
Arab cities. They included Nazareth, Israel’s 
largest Arab city, where he received a cere-
monial welcome from Mayor Ali Salam. For 
the first time in its history, Netanyahu’s 
party, Likud, is fielding a Muslim Arab as a 
candidate in the upcoming election: Nail 
Zoabi is slated to hold a ministerial post for 
Arab affairs in a future Netanyahu govern-
ment. Although he ranks only 39th on the 
party’s list of candidates, Netanyahu has 
promised he will enter the parliament in 
the event that Likud forms the new coali-
tion. The means to this end is the so-called 
Norwegian Law, which allows future minis-
ters to give up their parliamentary seats in 
favour of others. 
Netanyahu’s radical turnaround is to be 
explained, above all, by the possibility of 
his political survival being secured by Arab 
votes. Amid dwindling support within the 
ranks of Likud after a group led by his long-
time associate Gideon Saar split away and 
because of the ongoing corruption trials, 
the prime minister is politically weakened. 
At the same time, the split in the Arab List 
serves his strategic goals: if the Islamic Move-
ment makes it into the Knesset, he can 
hope to enjoy its backing; if it does not, the 
right-wing bloc of his supporters will be 
strengthened since the Arab List is likely to 
lose some mandates. According to the latest 
polls, it will have only nine or ten seats. 
The prime minister’s rapprochement 
with Israeli Arabs has rapidly changed the 
way in which other Jewish parties are deal-
ing with this group. In the run-up to the 
March 2021 national elections, political 
actors from the Left to the Right can be seen 
competing for the Arab vote. 
After three ballots in quick succession, a 
number of Jewish parties are politically and 
ideologically spent and are afraid they will 
not make it into the Knesset. They are de-
pendent on expanding their electorate in 
order to win enough votes. The idea is that 
involvement with Arab politicians would 
open up the Arab electorate to them. 
Meretz a left-wing Zionist party, has 
introduced three Arab candidates in fourth, 
fifth and ninth positions on the new party 
list with which it launched its election 
campaign. In fifth and fourth positions are 
Issawi Frej, who has already represented 
Meretz in the Knesset once, and Ghaida 
Rinawie Zoabi, the co-founder and former 
director of the Injaz non-governmental 
organization, which advocates the pro-
fessionalization of Arab local politics. The 
order of the candidates on this list is note-
worthy as Meretz has never nominated 
more than one Arab candidate for the top 
positions. Under the leadership of former 
General Ehud Barak, it focused entirely 
during the last elections (in March 2020) 
on the potential left-wing Zionist Jewish 
electorate and declined to run any Arab 
candidates. 
The Labour Party (Avoda) is pursuing a 
similar course. After having participated in 
the government of national unity through 
several deputies and even provided two 
ministers, it has chosen the direct opposite 
approach for the upcoming election under 
the new leadership of Merav Michaeli. With 
the Muslim film director Ibtisam Mara‘ana 
and Amir Khniffes, a member of the Druze 
religious community, it is fielding two Arab 
candidates in seventh and fifteenth place. 
These rankings do not offer very good pros-
pects of entering the parliament, while 
Mara‘ana was almost disqualified from 
running in the election over anti-Zionist 
comments. Nevertheless, the line-up has 
a symbolic significance that is crucial for 
expanding the party’s electorate and under-
scores the party’s renewed overtly left-wing 
stance. Both Meretz and Avoda hope to 
make it into the Knesset with their choice 
of candidates, after having had to join 
forces with other parties in the previous 
two elections. 
A rapprochement with Arab voters is 
also under way in the centre of the political 
spectrum. Yair Lapid, the head of Yesh Atid, 
which surveys rank as the second strongest 
party after Likud, is seen as the leader 
of the “anti-Bibi bloc” of the Left and the 
Centre for the upcoming election. Lapid, 
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who until now has kept his distance from 
Arab politicians and made disparaging 
comments about them, has said he does 
not rule out a coalition with Arab parties. 
The Arab Discourse: Between 
Ideology and Pragmatism 
That the Jewish parties are now showing an 
interest in Arab voters is not the only new 
development. There is also a growing desire 
among the Arab population for political 
integration and participation, although 
the picture is somewhat mixed. Until now, 
the Arab population has been represented 
mainly by the Joint List, which, however, 
comprises actors of different political hues: 
communists, moderate and more radical 
nationalists and, until recently, Islamists. 
Points of friction have emerged within 
these parties. For example, in the summer 
of 2020, the List threatened to break up 
over a vote on LGBT rights. And there was 
also discord over whether the alliance 
should pragmatically adapt to the political 
circumstances. Because the Islamic Move-
ment wanted to cooperate with right-wing 
Jewish parties, it took the decision to leave 
the Joint List. 
The three remaining parties in the Joint 
List – Hadash, Balad and Ta’al – continue 
to act, above all, along traditional ideology-
based political lines. They emphasize the 
affiliation between the Israeli Arabs and the 
Palestinian nation. Moreover, they regard 
the political struggle to secure democratic 
rights in the state of Israel as directly linked 
to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. They reject the state of Israel’s self-
designation as “Jewish and democratic” and 
advocate a full-fledged Arab-Palestinian iden-
tity in a state of equal citizens. While these 
principles serve as a common denominator 
for different ideological starting points, they 
cannot be enforced within Israeli politics. 
Furthermore, the influence of the Israeli 
Left has been dwindling for a long time. 
Thus, if the Arab List were to continue to 
work together with the Left over the next 
few years, it would likely mean cooperating 
with a weak opposition that has no chance 
of gaining power. Although the Arab List 
and the Left have fundamentally the same 
view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
issue seems to be losing political relevance 
for Israeli society as a whole and for large 
parts of the Arab population. A survey car-
ried out in December 2020 showed that the 
conflict ranks only seventh among the 
issues that are important for Arab Israelis, 
while the top six concerns of this group are 
all related to their immediate living situa-
tion. Occupying first place by a wide mar-
gin is the problem of crime and violence 
in Arab towns and villages: in 2020 alone, 
more than 100 murders were recorded 
there – a new high in the level of violence. 
Other crucial issues are improving the eco-
nomic situation, the regulation of planning 
and building, and integration into the Israeli 
labour market. 
Amid declining popular concern about 
the Palestinian issue, the views of many 
Arab Israelis and their political represen-
tatives in the Knesset are drifting apart. 
While representatives of the Joint List, for 
example, unanimously condemned the nor-
malization of relations between Arab states 
such as the United Arab Emirates and Bah-
rain, on the one hand, and Israel on the 
other, the majority of the Arab population 
(61.8 per cent) sees this development as posi-
tive. The reasons include the new tourist 
and economic opportunities that had been 
opened up for Israeli Arabs as well as for 
all other Israeli citizens. Only 35.5 per cent 
reject normalization because they believe 
it could disadvantage the peace process. 
Moreover, the very real concerns of Arab 
Israeli voters – such as security and eco-
nomic prosperity – do not seem to have 
received enough attention, judging at least 
from public comments by the Joint List. 
Satisfaction with the party alliance has 
decreased in recent years. What has become 
important for Israeli Arabs is the imple-
mentation of measures to improve their 
living situation. The majority of the popu-
lation believes that the Arab List has not 
made any significant contributions in this 
area. That is why the number of non-voters 
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in the Arab community appears to be grow-
ing again. In particular, it is the hopes of 
young Arab Israelis that have been dashed, 
as a February 2021 survey showed. Above 
all, the younger generation wants to be 
involved in political decision-making; and, 
in this respect, it is becoming more and 
more like its Jewish counterpart. The social 
integration now under way runs counter 
to the isolationism of Arab politics to date. 
The young Israeli Arabs of today are well 
educated and represented in almost every 
profession. They play a much more visible 
role in public than their parents and grand-
parents and display a new political self-
confidence. They want to use the available 
democratic opportunities to increase the 
political weight they carry in the state. 
During the current election campaign, this 
trend is morphing into a new direction in 
Arab-Israeli politics. 
 
The New Type of Arab Politician 
Some of those Arab politicians with whom 
Jewish parties are engaging ahead of the 
upcoming election represent the shift from 
ideological to pragmatic politics and stronger 
political integration. The common destiny 
of the Palestinians and the Jewish identity 
of the state are no longer fundamental to 
their political agenda. Rather, their focus 
is on improving the immediate living con-
ditions of Arab Israelis. And their aim is to 
achieve this from within, namely through 
cooperation with Israeli institutions and 
the Jewish political establishment. 
An example of such a politician is Ghaida 
Rinawie Zoabi, an Arab candidate of the 
left-wing Zionist party Meretz. While she 
frequently refers to her Palestinian identity, 
her focus is on domestic issues. By her own 
admission, her political agenda is to raise 
the status of Arab women, improve the 
quality of Arab local administration, estab-
lish distributive justice and address the 
issues of construction, social assistance, as 
well as education and development. Rinawie 
Zoabi has decades-long experience in nego-
tiating with the Israeli government. Her 
political demands are anchored in a civil 
discourse according to which the Arab 
population is entitled to equal rights on the 
grounds of having equal democratic Israeli 
citizenship. By this, she means not only the 
equalization of living conditions but also 
the right to have a say in politics. In an 
interview with the Israeli daily newspa-
per The Marker, she said: “Today there is a 
young Arab generation that sees itself on 
equal terms with Jews and demands equal 
citizenship. People [...] want to influence 
[not only] what happens in [the Arab towns 
of] Umm Al-Fahm and Rahat but also the 
decision-making processes in the state of 
Israel as a whole.” 
Similarly, the political demands of Man-
sour Abbas, the head of the Islamic Move-
ment (Ra’am), which was part of the Joint 
List in the Knesset until the end of January 
2021, no longer have to do explicitly with 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but rather 
with everyday life. Abbas cultivates real-
politik rhetoric. On the pro-government 
television channel Arutz 20, he defended 
his new course in a speech that urged the 
Israeli Arabs to be “pragmatic and no longer 
nationalist.” In this way, he hopes to gain 
support from the Israeli Right for local 
issues such as the fight against organized 
crime and violence in Arab towns and 
villages. On 1 March 2021, Netanyahu’s 
government approved a budget of 150 mil-
lion NIS for this purpose. 
In the Israeli daily newspaper Ma‘ariv, 
Abbas explained that his new course in-
volves not an ideological but a strategic 
change. He himself belongs neither to the 
Left nor the Right, he said, but is merely 
being pragmatic in the face of a right-wing 
government that is likely to remain in 
power. At the same time, Abbas points out 
that as regards close collaboration with the 
Right, there is common ground on socio-
cultural issues between the Jewish religious 
right wing and the religious and conserva-
tive Arab politicians of the Islamic Move-
ment and their voters. 
While Rinawie Zoabi’s programme could 
inspire young and urban voters, the Islamic 
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Movement under Abbas wants to win over 
disconnected Arab groups, including the 
Bedouins of the Negev. On the one hand, 
this group belongs to the conservative elec-
torate; on the other, they have long been 
frustrated by the desolate state of their 
villages and what they perceive as the lack 
of action on the part of the Arab List. 
The political analyst Mohammad 
Darawshe, who in January introduced his 
newly founded Arab-Israeli party Ma‘an, is 
another embodiment of the new type of 
Arab politician. Ma‘an means “together” in 
Arabic and alludes to the partnership and 
coexistence of Jews and Arabs. From the 
outset, Darawshe has made it clear that his 
party recognizes Israel as a “Jewish state”. 
However, while he has confirmed his ob-
vious interest in a peaceful solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he has explained 
that – unlike the parties of the Joint List – 
Ma‘an will devote itself entirely to domestic 
Israeli issues rather than pursuing an “ideolo-
gized” regional and foreign policy. 
There are strategic advantages to this 
new direction in Arab politics. In contrast 
with Arab candidates who strongly em-
phasize their affiliation with the other 
party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
who stand in opposition to the state, the 
new-style Arab politicians identify them-
selves, first and foremost, as Israeli citizens 
and their agenda is compatible with that of 
other actors in the Israeli political system. 
They are more easily accepted as partners 
not only by Jewish parties but also by the 
Jewish majority. They themselves hope that 
their new rhetoric and purely domestic 
Israeli agenda will improve their chances of 
exercising political influence and becoming 
close to decision-making. At the same time, 
they are signalling a willingness to assume 
responsibility. Thanks to this approach, 
two concerns of the Arab-Israelis are being 
addressed at once – namely, their growing 
desire for political integration and their 
demand that more attention be paid to 
their concrete problems. 
That the new Arab political approach can 
be successful in the longer term is shown 
by the experience gained in local politics. 
At this level, Jewish-Arab cooperation func-
tions across the various political camps 
because ideologically divisive issues such as 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are excluded 
from the agenda. 
Local politics lead the way 
As elsewhere in the world, local politics 
in Israel are characterized by the virtual 
absence of ideology. In contrast with 
national politics, there is no coupling of 
issues to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or 
questions of state identity. Not even the 
Nation-State Law – which, passed just a 
few months before the 2018 local elections, 
established Israel as the nation-state of the 
Jewish people – was a subject for discus-
sion during campaigning in the Arab sector. 
Local politics in the Arab communities 
are concerned mainly with the domestic 
issues that affect this segment of the popu-
lation. These are the same issues on which 
Arab politicians such as Rinawie Zoabi, 
Abbas and Darawshe are focused at the 
national level. They, too, are pursuing not 
an agenda for society as a whole but an 
Arab-Israeli agenda. They want to see real 
improvements in the living conditions of 
Arab Israelis. The most pressing issues are 
security, housing, education and urban 
infrastructure, all of which are typical areas 
of local politics. 
Just as the practical focus is not new, 
so the basis for argument is familiar, too. 
Local politicians understand that emphasiz-
ing equal Israeli citizenship for Jews and 
Arabs is the most reasonable strategy to 
improve their own negotiating position vis-
à-vis state institutions. The pragmatic and 
targeted approach of Arab local politicians 
is to point out how Arab citizens are materi-
ally disadvantaged compared with their 
Jewish counterparts and to underscore the 
state’s interest in doing away with this 
imbalance in the long run. For example, 
in 2015, following intensive negotiations 
between Arab actors, including Rinawie 
Zoabi, and the Israeli government, a five-
year plan for the economic development 
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of Arab municipalities was adopted. Its aim 
was to redistribute state funding so that 
the amount received by Arab municipalities 
was proportional to the 20 per cent share 
of Arab Israelis in the overall population. 
The plan provided for a budget of up to 15 
billion NIS and was extended for another 
year in the autumn of 2020. 
At the same time, local politics show that 
Arab Israelis are very keen to make use of 
the political means at their disposal. While 
their participation in national elections is 
still below the average for the population as 
a whole, turnout in local elections in Arab 
towns and villages is much higher than in 
Jewish municipalities: an average of 85 per 
cent compared with just 61 per cent in 
2018. If, in future, national politics were to 
pay as much substantive attention to the 
needs of Arab Israelis, voter turnout among 
this segment could increase at the national 
level, too. 
Arab-Jewish Cooperation 
While it is true that since the state of Israel 
came into existence, Arab parties have never 
participated in government, coalitions of 
Jewish and Arab parties can be found in 
local politics. Joint administrations exist in 
large mixed cities such as Tel Aviv-Jaffa and 
Haifa, the mayors of which belong to the 
traditionally centre-left Labour Party. At 
the same time, the number of Jewish-Arab 
administrations has grown in cities where 
the mayors are from right-wing nationalist 
Jewish parties such as Likud and the Rus-
sian-speaking party Ysrael Beitenu. Since 
the 2018 local elections, more Jewish-Arab 
administrations have emerged – a surprise 
result of that ballot. They include such 
diverse mixed towns as Acre, Lod, Ramla, 
Nof HaGalil and Ma‘alot Tarshiha. Besides 
demography, it is, above all, common inter-
ests that speak in favour of this new co-
operation. 
Municipal affairs such as the funding of 
housing construction, road transport and 
sports and recreation facilities affect all 
groups of the population equally. In local 
politics, Jews and Arabs can focus on issues 
in which they have a common interest and 
which do not polarize. 
This practice could serve as a model for 
national politics, especially if there are ben-
efits for both sides. For Arab local politi-
cians, the advantages of cooperation out-
weigh the disadvantages, as they gain better 
access to the budget and are therefore able 
to act more effectively on behalf of their 
constituents. However, in mixed Jewish-
Arab cities, the chances of electing an Arab 
mayor are virtually nil. For this reason, 
Arab politicians often have no choice but to 
cooperate in order to ensure that the Arab 
population receives roughly as much fund-
ing as the Jewish population. Bearing this 
in mind could also be relevant in the 
Knesset, where there is a similar power 
constellation. 
For Jewish coalition partners, too, there 
are pragmatic reasons for the involvement 
of Arab parties. It makes sense to involve 
as many parliamentary deputies with the 
same local political goals as possible for the 
sake of more effective government. 
However, increased cooperation between 
Jewish and Arab local politicians does not 
necessarily mean that the two sides are 
becoming closer ideologically. This cannot 
be expected to happen at the national level, 
too. Rather, it is easier to smooth over ideo-
logical differences at both the local and 
national levels when pragmatic actors work 
together. 
In local politics, the quality of coopera-
tion varies from place to place depending 
on the respective politicians and political 
circumstances. On the one hand, Arab 
politicians hold high office in many of the 
cities where there is Jewish-Arab coopera-
tion: Acre, Ma‘alot Tarshiha and Nof 
HaGalil, among others, have an Arab deputy 
mayor. On the other hand, coexistence 
between Jews and Arabs continues to be 
marked by conflict, as, for example, in the 
city of Lod, whose mayor, Yair Revivo, has 
often attracted attention for his anti-Arab 
remarks. But given the segregation of the 
two groups – even in mixed cities, they 
live in different neighbourhoods – any 
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cooperation is to be regarded as positive. 
And that remains the case even if working 
together is pragmatically justified and says 
little about the actual relationship between 
the two groups. 
Outlook 
For the first time ever at the national level, 
it is possible to observe, in this election cam-
paign, a process that has long been taking 
place both at the local level and in the Arab 
discourse. Arab-Israeli politics are becoming 
diversified, and this has the potential to 
change the overall political landscape in 
the longer term. Alongside the traditional 
politics of the Joint List, which focuses on 
disputes within society, there are Arab poli-
ticians coming to the fore who put more 
emphasis on substantive issues. By doing 
so, they are following the growing wishes 
of those parts of the Arab-Israeli population 
that want greater political participation and 
an active politics that serves the concrete 
interests of Israeli Arabs – above all, im-
proved security and better living conditions. 
While it is likely that in the upcoming 
election, many Arab Israelis will remain 
loyal to the shrunken Joint List and political 
isolationism, it is already possible to speak 
of a gradual “normalization”. This mani-
fests itself in Israeli Arabs wanting to inte-
grate more fully into the state and thereby 
prevent their interests as Israeli citizens 
being overshadowed by an overarching Pal-
estinian identity and solidarity with Pales-
tinians in the Middle East conflict. At the 
same time, Zionist parties are making efforts 
not seen before and at times unimaginable 
to win Arab votes for themselves or even to 
cooperate with Arab parties. 
The forthcoming election will show just 
how successful these first steps towards 
normalization might be. The willingness to 
engage in this process is now evident both 
in Israeli politics and among the population. 
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